Report into Worst US Ski Avalanche Published

4th April 2026

Last modified on April 14th, 2026

The report by US Forest Service National Avalanche Center and Colorado Avalanche Information Center examined:

• The snowpack conditions
• The route taken by the party
• An account of the rescue
• Group travel decisions

The snowpack in the area was unstable in general and then the huge storm hit.

See here for the full report released on Avalanche.org

“A strong winter storm moved through the area from February 15 through February 19,” the report states.

The storm was accompanied by very strong winds that loaded some slopes.

The avalanche risk at the time was Level 3 (considerable), but the slope where the accident happened had much wind-blown snow on it.

 “The avalanche occurred on a slope where the wind had redistributed the snowfall, piling it into drifts far deeper than the amount measured at nearby weather stations,” said the report.

We posted on the incident at the time on PlanetSKI:

• Nine skiers missing after avalanche in USA
• Bodies of nine skiers recovered from US avalanche

The report found that the guided group deviated from basic safety practices in crossing slide-prone terrain close together despite a warning that avalanches were expected.

The report stops short of assigning blame, but raises questions about the group’s decisions and the guiding company’s choice to travel as avalanche risk remained high.

The Guide company, Blackbird Mountain Guides, said that all guides on the trip were trained or certified in backcountry skiing by the American Mountain Guides Association and were instructors with the American Institute for Avalanche Research and Education.

It added that guides in the field “are in communication with senior guides at our base, to discuss conditions and routing based upon conditions.”

It was the worst ski avalanche incident in the US since 1982 when seven people died in the Alpine Meadows Ski Resort near Lake Tahoe, in California.

The deadliest avalanche recorded in the US was in 1910 in Wellington, Washington, where 96 people were killed after a large avalanche swept two Great Northern passenger trains into a gorge.

The report reveals that initially the 15-person party was not a single group.

The report says that two groups were on guided trips to the Frog Lake Huts in the Castle Peak area on Donner Summit, February 15–17, 2026.

The groups were made up of six females with two  guides, plus another group of three males with two  guides, all from Blackbird Mountain Guides.

On the morning of February 17, the members of these two guided groups from the same guide service were combined into a single group with four guides for the return to the trailhead.

At some point before the avalanche released two members of the group fell behind.

Guide #4 in the back was assisting Client #11 with a ski binding toe-piece issue.

That equipment failure likely saved their lives as they were not in the main group when the avalanche struck.

The report draws on survivor testimony published by the New York Times on February 28, 2026, to reconstruct the moments of the avalanche itself.

The report was unable to discover the cause of the avalanche.

“It is unclear if this avalanche was triggered by the party or was a natural avalanche,” it said.

In roughly 90% of avalanche accidents the avalanche is triggered by the skiers themselves.

The snowpack sits in a state of natural equilibrium, until the weight of a skier or snowboarder tips the scales and triggers an avalanche.

It is unclear if this happened in this instance according to the report.

“A ski guide in the group yelled ‘Avalanche’ and Client #10 looked up to see a wall of white with strange blurs of colours,” the report states, quoting the account in the New York Times.

He realised that the colours were the tumbling skis and clothing of the other skiers.

He dived behind a dead tree and was quickly buried by the avalanche debris.

Client #11 and Guide #4, still behind with the binding repair reached the rest of the group moments later and found a debris field.

They had not seen the avalanche occur.

The report also confirms for the first time that several members of the group were equipped with avalanche airbag backpacks.

None was deployed in this accident.

All 13 of the individuals caught in the avalanche were buried within the area outlined by the small yellow box.

Image c/o Sierra Avalanche Centre.

The start location of the avalanche was never visible as new snow was filling it in even as the avalanche ran.

“The avalanche is believed to have been a soft slab of size D2 to D2.5 with the exact weak layer and bed surface unknown,” said the report.

It ran approximately 400 vertical feet, through trees at mid-path and below.

SAR responders estimated the debris field at 100 feet wide.

The most striking new material in the report is the step-by-step account of the companion rescue.

Two people, one a guide and one a client, worked through a debris field in a blizzard with 125 mph wind gusts on the ridge above them.

Client #10 forced himself out from beneath the debris and shouted that people were buried, pointing to the last location he had seen his companions.

Guide #4 began a transceiver search.

Client #11 spotted a ski pole protruding from the debris surface, and it was moving.

He dug to find Client #9, who had an airway along his arm and pole up to the snow surface and indicated he was not seriously hurt.

Guide #4 located Clients #8 and #7 via transceiver search and probe.

Both were initially excavated only enough to expose their faces.

“While digging for Client #7 they encountered the leg of another group member and the backpack of yet another group member,” said he report.

Continuing to dig, the group uncovered Guide #3 and Client #6.

Both were assessed as showing no signs of life.

The report notes that the group then redirected to fully excavate Clients #7 and #8, both assessed as injured.

A decision was made to move the six survivors down the slope to a position away from the avalanche path.

An emergency shelter was constructed by Guide #4, and care was given to Clients #7 and #8.

Client #10 had placed a 911 call around 11:30 a.m., when the search began.

SAR teams were dispatched, including ski teams from the Castle Peak trailhead, and snowcat teams heading toward the Frog Lake Huts via the Tahoe Donner Cross Country Center.

Tahoe Nordic Search and Rescue reached the accident site at approximately 5:30 p.m.

By that point, roughly two feet of new snow had settled over the debris field.

SAR responders could only locate the edges and toe of the debris where the depth their boots penetrated the snowpack.

On the debris, they could stand and walk.

Off the edge of it, they sank past their waists.

TNSAR members found the eight remaining buried victims that evening.

The report states they were “all buried 3 to 8 feet deep within a 20′ x 20′ area.”

All eight were confirmed dead.

The six survivors were then escorted, on skis, back up and over Red Dot Pass to the Frog Lake Huts, from where they were evacuated by snowcat to the Tahoe Donner Cross Country Center.

The ninth victim was not recovered until February 20, following a sustained mitigation operation using PG&E helicopters deploying approximately 5,500-pound, 660-gallon water buckets on the slope.

Image c/o Sierra Avalanche Centre.

The final four victims were recovered on February 21.

The investigators offer four specific findings:

• The binding failure which delayed Guide #4 and Client #11 may have been the reason both survived, and that their subsequent companion rescue directly saved lives: “2 of the 4 buried survivors required companion rescue to excavate the snow that covered their airways. The rapid location and excavation of these two individuals was lifesaving.”

• This group traveled below avalanche terrain and through the runout zone of an avalanche path during a period when a natural or human triggered avalanche was likely to very likely.

• The accepted best practice of “exposing only one person at a time to avalanche terrain” was not followed.

• Group size mattered: “This group consisted of 15 people. Analysis of past avalanche accidents has indicated that larger group sizes (4 or more people) have higher chances of being caught in avalanches,” citing peer-reviewed research published in Wilderness & Environmental Medicine in 2016.

Blackbird Mountain Guides said in a statement after the report was published that it “does not reflect the full scope of what transpired and does not include all of the facts and information currently under review.”

Company spokeswoman, Mary Ann Pruitt, said the company is “cooperating fully with authorities and will share more when it is appropriate and based on verified and confirmed findings.”

The report is clear about what remains unknown:

“Many of the details surrounding this accident and the events leading up to it remain unknown,” including human factors, decision-making, specific travel plans, and the precise mechanics of the avalanche itself.”

It notes that the account relies heavily on the testimony of two survivors who were near the back of the group and had no role in route planning.

Both the Nevada County Sheriff’s Office and the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health are conducting separate and active investigations into the incident.

No findings or charges have been announced.

The investigators make the following points:

• All the fatal avalanche accidents we investigate are tragic events.
• We do our best to describe each accident to help the people involved, and the community as a whole better understand them.
• Many of the details surrounding this accident remain unknown, especially concerning human factors, decision making, travel plans, specifics of the avalanche, etc.
• As more details emerge over time, more learning opportunities will present themselves.

Clients who died in the incident:

• Carrie Atkin, 46, of Soda Springs
• Lizbeth Clabaugh, 52, of Boise, Idaho
• Danielle Keatley, 44, of Soda Springs and Larkspur
• Kate Morse, 45, of Soda Springs and Tiburon
• Caroline Sekar, 45, of Soda Springs and San Francisco
• Katherine Vitt, 43, of Greenbrae

Blackbird guides who lost their lives:

• Andrew Alissandratos, 34, of Verdi, Nevada
• Nicole Choo, 42, of South Lake Tahoe
• Michael Henry, 30, of Tampa, Florida

See here for the full report released on Avalanche.org

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